LEGAL COLUMN
WHEELS WITHIN WHEELS
In this particular case, a
Here Jonathan Stern, counsel at Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, highlights a recent legal case
involving a PRM: that of Armstrong v. Hawaiian Airlines.
passenger named Armstrong
ew on Hawaiian Airlines
from Kauai to Brisbane.
Arrived in Brisbane, he was
provided with wheelchair service
to the baggage claim, but the
Qantas employee who, pursuant
to a pre-existing ground
handling agreement, provided
the wheelchair service, advised
him that no assistance with his
luggage was actually available.
Unfortunately, Armstrong did
not live up to his name for he
subsequently injured his arm
li ing one of his bags from the
luggage carousel.
The question of liability
e Montreal Convention
provides the following
guidelines.
“ e carrier is liable for
damage sustained in case of
death or bodily injury of a
passenger upon condition only
that the accident which caused
the death or injury took place
on board the aircra or in the
course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking.”
e issue for the federal
court on the airline’s motion
for summary judgement was
whether there had been such an
“accident.” An “accident”, in legal
“In the Armstrong case, there was an
unusual internal reaction to li ing a bag
from the carousel”
parlance, has been noted as “an
unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the
passenger.” (See Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405, 1985).
us, if, as in the Saks case,
the injury results from normal
operation and is attributable to
a passenger’s abnormal internal
reaction thereto, this would
equate to a non-accident event.
However, recognising that
injuries generally result from
a chain of events, the courts
require only that one link in the
causal chain quali es.
The carrier’s defence
Hawaiian argued that
Armstrong’s arm injury resulted
from his own internal reaction
to normal and expected
operations. Armstrong, on the
other hand, maintained that it
was the unusual and unexpected
declination by Hawaiian’s ground
handler to provide assistance
with his luggage that had caused
his injury. e Court recognised
that the event triggering the
“accident” could be construed
as inaction, as was the case in
Olympic Airways v. Husain,
540 U.S. 644 (2004). ere, a
passenger gravely allergic to
cigarette smoke was denied the
opportunity to change seats
in order to distance himself
from the cigarette smoke. Such
a declination could be the
event that would constitute
an “accident”, even though the
injury also resulted from the
passenger’s unusual internal
reaction to exposure to cigarette
smoke.
Causal or non-causal?
In the Armstrong case, there was
an unusual internal reaction to
li ing a bag from the carousel.
Nonetheless, the Court had to
decide whether another link in
the causal chain was unusual
or unexpected and external
to the passenger. e Court
held that the refusal to provide
assistance upon request could
so qualify. e question is
whether that refusal was unusual
or unexpected. e Court
observed that the Ninth Circuit
has held that “the jury would
consider industry standards,
best practices, expert medical
testimony, and any other relevant
evidence” to determine whether
the challenged action was
unexpected or unusual (2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129971, at
*22-23, citing Baillie v. MedAire,
Inc., 764 Fed. App’x 597, 598,
9th Cir. 2019). Finding su cient
evidence to raise a question of
fact whether the declination
of assistance was unusual or
unexpected, the Court denied
the carrier’s motion for summary
judgment. ghi
Jonathan Stern is counsel in the Litigation
Department and a member of the Aviation,
Insurance Services and Appellate Groups.
His practice focuses on aerospace-related
litigation, including civil rights cases
against airlines, insurance coverage
and claims handling matters involving
aerospace insurance, and personal injury
and wrongful death litigation involving
aviation products or aviation operations.
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